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ALD-166
 
       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-1409 
 ___________ 
 
 ANTHONY J. BRODZKI, 
        Appellant 
 v. 
 
 TRIBUNE COMPANY 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of Delaware 
 (D.C. Civil No. 1-11-cv-00918) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 26, 2012 
 Before:  SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit 
 (Opinion filed: May 8, 2012) 
Judges 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Anthony Brodzki, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order 
dismissing his complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and denying his 
motion for reconsideration.  For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss Brodzki’s appeal 
pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), as well. 
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 In October 2011, Brodzki filed a diversity action in the District Court against the 
Tribune Company, a Delaware corporation, alleging the torts of defamation and slander, 
and seeking $50 million in damages and an injunction prohibiting “WGN from all 
privacy violations mind and body.”  In the complaint, Brodzki claimed that he was at 
home in Texas watching a Chicago Cubs baseball game on WGN when the Cubs’ general 
manager and the WGN host accused Brodzki on air of being a pedophile and of having 
publicly exposed himself.   
 Brodzki applied for, and was awarded, in forma pauperis status, after which the 
District Court screened his complaint for legal sufficiency pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2).  The District Court noted that Brodzki has a history of filing legally 
frivolous lawsuits, which has resulted in his being banned from filing civil suits in the 
Northern District of Illinois without prior court authorization and in the imposition of 
sanctions in at least one case in the Northern District of Texas.  The District Court 
reasoned that the instant complaint -- one of at least seven similar complaints he has filed 
in the District of Delaware since 2010 -- did not adequately state a cause of action and 
that his allegations were “fantastical, delusional, irrational, and frivolous.”  D. Ct. Doc. 
No. 5, 4.  Accordingly, the District Court dismissed the complaint under § 1915(e)(2).  
Brodzki filed an objection, which the District Court construed as a motion for 
reconsideration and then denied.  Brodzki timely filed a notice of appeal. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint under § 1915.  See Allah v. 
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Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  Because Brodzki was proceeding in forma 
pauperis, the District Court was required to dismiss his complaint if it failed to state a 
claim on which relief may be granted.  § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  The legal standard for 
dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2) is the same as that 
for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  See Tourscher v. 
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).  To withstand scrutiny under 
§ 1915(e)(2), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  Threadbare 
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do 
not suffice.”  Id. at 678.  Further, § 1915(e)(2) “accords judges . . . the unusual power to 
pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose 
factual contentions are clearly baseless.”  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).  
“Examples . . . are claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios . . . .”  Id.
 We agree with the District Court that Brodzki’s bare allegations, without more, 
were insufficient to state a claim under 
 at 328.   
Iqbal.  Further, in light of the nature of Brodzki’s 
factual allegations, we perceive no error in the District Court’s conclusion that granting 
Brodzki leave to amend his complaint would have been futile.1
                                                 
1  Before dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2), a 
plaintiff must be afforded the opportunity to amend the complaint unless amendment 
would be inequitable or futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 
114 (3d Cir. 2002).   
  Accordingly, it was 
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appropriate for the District Court to dismiss his complaint. 
 Nor was there any error in denying Brodzki’s “objections” inasmuch as the 
objections amounted to a motion to reconsider.  We review the denial of a motion to 
reconsider for abuse of discretion.  See Caver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 258 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  To prevail on a motion for reconsideration, a litigant must demonstrate:  
“(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence . . 
.; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.”  
Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros
 Because Brodzki is proceeding in forma pauperis on appeal, we must dismiss the 
appeal if it is legally frivolous.  
, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 
1999).  Brodzki’s submission to the District Court did not satisfy any of these 
requirements, and the District Court appropriately denied the motion. 
See
 
 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).  For the foregoing reasons, 
we will dismiss the appeal. 
 
